134. TERROR DEVICES. A still less important range of ex-
periment concerned the creation of terror devices--whistles attached to
shells, weapon drops to imaginary undergrounds, etc. Though often in-
teresting, these played no appreciable part in the war as a whole. The
German attacks on Holland, Belgium and France made very liberal use of
such methods. This field overlaps in part with orthodox military deception
procedures, such as were illustrated in the post-war press photographs of
dummy tanks, jeeps, ete., which were made of rubber and could be inflated.
135. SYSTEMATIZATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. The
major development of psychological warfare during World War II may per-
haps be summed up in terms of its systematization. The war brought forth
few wholly new devices, outside of the use of radio. The novelty consisted
of the close integration of psychological warfare with national policy on the
one hand and with military operations on the other. All major participants,
to a greater or less degree, utilized military propaganda units as aids to
field operations. The increased use of air power made possible the dissemi-
nation of leaflets, pamphlets and occasional books on a tremendous scale.
Fitting all these operations to the national governments, the theater or field
army headquarters, all appropriate military echelons, and then coordinating
propaganda operations one with the other was a task which could not have
been accomplished without the plentiful use of the radio and the duplicating
machine. World War II made psychological warfare a continuous, systematic,
and purposeful part of the general conduct of war. (See Paragraph 58.)
136. CONSOLIDATION PROPAGANDA. The value of psychological
warfare did not end with the cessation of hostilities. Consolidation propa-
ganda, carried out under the authority of the military headquarters in charge
of occupation, proved invaluable in conveying commands of the occupying
power to the populace concerned. By the use of propaganda, cooperation
was ensured much more swiftly; greater public interest was aroused; and
persons friendly to the occupying power were given a chance to step forward
and to assist the occupation. In the case of friendly or dubious areas, con-
solidation facilities put local publishing and broadcasting back on schedule
and assured the military of a means of getting help from the people.
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