VIII. Combat Propaganda Operations
¶64. COMBAT PROPAGANDA ORGANIZATION. During World
War II, some theaters never extended systematic psychological warfare
organization below the theater headquarters level. Others established
elaborate operational units, of which the most ambitious were the First
and Second Mobile Broadcasting Companies. These worked in North Africa,
Italy, and France. It was found that they functioned best when their com-
ponent elements were broken down into smaller teams. The ultimate pat-
tern in almost all instances consisted of the creation of a small producing
center (in SHAEF, PWD ran into the hundreds; in China, the staff for
psychological warfare was not over a dozen men till the last months of war)
which was capable of composing and printing leaflets. Leaflets produced
in the United States, with the actual printing matrices sent to the theaters,
were not successful; they were too remote from theater problems; the
consequence was that leaflet production became the backbone of each theater
or, in the case of Europe, Army propaganda headquarters. Occasional
tactical leaflets were produced by smaller units, sometimes being mimeo-
graphed by an officer single-handed, but in most cases the leaflet-printing
function remained a major task. The Davidson and Webbenderfer presses,
which were used, are not very mobile, and paper supply is a constant
logistic problem.
165. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMAND. Each theater
commander was in complete charge of psychological warfare so far as its
use or non-use was concerned. He also controlled the entry into his com-
mand of civilian propaganda personnel. Theater commanders did not possess
authority to change national propaganda policy, to initiate political propaganda
without coordinating with the Department of State, or to improvise propaganda
without reference to the propaganda of other theaters or of the continental
United States. Theater commanders sometimes used Psychological Warfare
as the equivalent of a G-6, sometimes combined it with G-5, sometimes sub-
ordinated it to G-3, usually attached it to G-2, and in one instance operated
it under the direct scrutiny of a Military Secretary to the Supreme Commander.
166. COMBAT PROPAGANDA RADIO. Radio broadcast facilities
were found to be extremely valuable for strategic and consolidation propaganda.
The relative immobility of even the mobile radio stations precluded their
rapid shift in the course of tactical changes, and the radio broadcast facili-
ties as such had little opportunity to reach enemy troops.
Monitoring by com-
167. COMBAT PROPAGANDA MONITORING.
bat propaganda units was found to provide invaluable materials for loud-
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