militarizing the Rhineland, by making it seem a mere matter of prestige.
He bullied Austria into submission; Nazi troops crossed the frontier with-
out opposition and reduced the whole country without having to fight. This
was accomplished by careful analysis of public opinion in the possible
enemy states and by the use of propaganda to scare the victim while assur-
ing all other prospective victims that the occasion in question was the last
aggression. Hitler used psychological warfare in the broad sense as well
as strategic and tactical propaganda. In 1938, with the Munich crisis, he
scored his greatest victory in psychological warfare. The Western democ-
racies (France, England) agreed to the partition of Czechoslovakia in a
conference with the Axis (Italy, Germany) while the Russians were excluded
from the bargaining. Hitler's propaganda emphasized German claims to
the Czech territory in question, and promised no more aggression. Using
the threat of force and the manipulation of anti-World War opinion in the
democracies themselves, Hitler's propaganda won. A few months later he
took the rest of Czechoslovakia and followed that by bullying Russia into a
neutrality agreement. The scene was ready for further aggression. Psy-
chological warfare had made the victims themselves agree to each single
aggression, had made them hope it was the last, and had kept them from
forming an alliance to meet the common danger.
¶21. MILITARY THREAT BEHIND THE PROPAGANDA OPERATION.
These successes could not have been won if suspicions between Communists
and democratic countries had not been high, if anti-war sentiment had not
been so strong, if Hitler had been more frank about his ultimate aims.
Furthermore, they could not have been won if psychological warfare had not
been backed up by a very real threat of armed force. Hitler did not begin his
major aggressions until he had a military edge on his opponents, and his propa-
ganda made his strength seem greater than it was. Whenever he was not
operating he let his army and Luftwaffe seem weak, and encouraged the idea
he was unready; but crises were underscored with the threat of real military
force. Unless the force had actually been there, the powers of Europe would
not have yielded. This demonstrates the axiom that psychological warfare
cannot work purely by itself; it needs force or the very real threat of force
to make it effective. (The German General Staff after the war admitted that
Germany's bluff could have been called, but Hitler never left the opposition
(no way out). He always offered peace as the reward for non-interference
in his one particular demand of the time. He never forced all demands at
once, so that his enemies could look at the German armed forces, estimate
the situation, estimate the cost of war, and make a reasoned decision as to
whether beating the Germans or giving in were better.)
122. THE BLACK PROPAGANDA OF THE AXIS FIFTH COLUMN.
One of Franco's generals boasted as his forces invested Madrid: "I have
five columns. Four here. And a fifth column inside the city." From this
9
