formed the indispensible function of finding personnel with the unusual
qualifications required for psychological warfare, re-training them, and
putting them. on either its own or the Army payroll. (Finding an eloquent
Pushtu-speaking person in a hurry is no easy task!) Finally, the national
agency did a great deal of the onerous fiscal and bookkeeping work, and
carried much of the budget load for psychological warfare.
159. MILITARY-CIVILIAN COORDINATION. Some of the worst
possible blunders of psychological warfare are those which can be com-
mitted when there is poor civilian-military coordination. During World
War I, the Kaiser's government never succeeded in setting up effective
coordination between the military and political agencies of government
for propaganda purposes; the British had great difficulty before they worked
out a smooth administrative and consultative machinery for the purpose.
In between wars, the Japanese lost a great deal of ground because of a lack
of such coordination; the government spokesmen promised that troop action
in the "China Incident" would halt; the next day the Army would move
forward, and Japan got a reputation for calculated trickery only half of which
was deserved. Part of their effects were the result of guile and wile; part
were the consequence of administrative confusion and independence of the
armed services. Hitler, in contrast, achieved in his psychological warfare
the smoothest military-political coordination which has yet operated on a
grand scale; he had total control of the government and people to start with.
In the United States, such coordination was achieved to a much less extent
than in Germany.

160. GENERAL PLANS. Proper coordination of psychological
warfare facilities permits the setting up of general plans which are coordi-
nated with both strategy and national policy. Hitler's propaganda worked
in intimate liaison with his military and air headquarters; when an opera-
tion such as the conquest of Poland was undertaken, the propagandists were
able to time their operations so as to be most useful to the combat elements.
Long-range purposes could be sought by clandestine operations and "white"
operations supplementing one another. Quislings, for example, could be re-
cruited by the Germans at any one time, but they would not keep over a long
period of peace without undergoing changes of heart, twinges of loyalty,
some desertions with attendant breach of security, and other deterioration.
Coordination of all facilities gave the maximum result.

T61.
CONTINGENCY PLANS. Foreseen contingencies are planned
in propaganda. An invasion, a landing, the surrender of an opponent, the
fall of a city--such news occasions call for special radio and leaflet opera-
tions. These too require coordination between various national-level or
general staff agencies, whatever the particular propaganda structure of a
country may be. In totalitarian countries, the single party must be included
so as to provide for appropriate "spontaneous joy," "mass demonstrations,"
and so forth.
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