speaker and leaflet operations. (In Burma, American psychological warfare
got news to the Japanese troops from Radio Tokyo--after editing it in pas-
sage--more rapidly than did the Japanese morale officers; Japanese music
was recorded off the air in an area where no Japanese phonograph record
had ever been played before.)
168. MORALE LEAFLETS. All leaflets were processed in a man-
ner similar to that shown on page 38. When the tactical situation was static,
morale leaflets (Illustrations #7 and #9) were used; in situations tactically
unfavorable for the enemy, contingency leaflets were made up (Illustration #4)
and surrender passes were distributed (Illustration #11). Morale leaflets
were found to be the most difficult to write. They had to achieve the most
definite effect with the least specific appeal; they involved no call to action.
The effect of morale leaflets has never been calculated. Surrender and news
leaflets can be tested by checking the number of prisoners who come in with
surrender passes, and then quizzing them on news to find out how much came
from news leaflets; but morale leaflets are not in a comparable situation, and
most prisoners were found inclined to make snap judgments on how they
should have felt when getting the morale leaflet, rather than how they did
feel.
T69. NEWSPAPERS AND NEWS LEAFLETS. News of common
interest--progress of the war, political developments closely connected
with the war, the appearance of new weapons, home news from the reader's
country--provided a medium of communication which carried more propa-
ganda than did all other means put together. News materials were used con-
tinuously, whenever the disseminator and his enemy stayed close enough
or stably enough together to permit circulation. Instances are given in the
Illustrations. It was found that the repetition of simple themes and slogans
was basic to the effective propagandizing of the news and that news, correct-
ly handled, never wore out its appeal.
170. LEAFLETS AND ORDER OF BATTLE. Order of battle in-
formation contributed tremendously to the effect of some very successful
leaflets. The mention of troops by their correct unit names, reference to
unpopular officers by name, correct description of enemy conditions--such
devices gave the enemy troops the bewildering feeling that they had no
security at all, and that the propagandist's forces were omnipotent. (In-
formation of this kind came in great part, of course, from prisoners.) How-
ever, the mistaken or incorrect use of names, or even the delivery of the
wrong leaflets to a given unit can undo much of the special effect obtained
through battle order information and through the revelation of correct front-
line intelligence. A simple leaflet which is sure of committing no blunder
is commonly more effective than a complicated or tricky leaflet which may
have unfavorable repercussions.
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