171. TACTICAL COORDINATION. The use of psychological war-
fare devices is ineffectual if the results desired are not rendered practical.
For example, pursuit planes should not ask for the surrender of individual
prisoners without explaining--in the leaflet--just how, where, and to whom
the prisoners should surrender. Invitations to surrender must always be
accompanied by control of the troops on the inviting side; if one prisoner
starts across and is picked off by an over-enthusiastic sniper, other surren-
ders are not likely to follow: positive harm will have been done. Coordina-
tion between artillery or tactical rockets and leaflet shelling is important;
the effect of leaflets can be stepped up measurably if heavy shelling is an-
nounced, delivered, lifted for the purpose of accepting surrenders, resumed,
lifted again. This type of coordination requires the presence of a psycho-
logical warfare liaison officer at the regimental level or below, whether such
an officer be one of the normal component trained in psychological warfare
techniques or an outsider detailed for the purpose.
172. ATROCITY PROPAGANDA. Atrocity propaganda created a
revulsion against war generally when it was employed in World War I. The
audience reacted against the enemy, but the reaction consisted of nausea and
nervous upset to such an extent that it is not now considered desirable to use
atrocity propaganda. It may lift morale momentarily, but its long-range ef-
fect is not favorable to morale. It will be found in almost every case that
rumors--resembling propaganda, except that they are not systematized to
achieve a known end--will circulate in the course of operations among the
troops themselves, alleging fearsome enemy atrocities. Inevitably, some of
these rumors have their foundation in fact. They should not be encouraged
and should be made the subject of propaganda campaigns only when the ne-
cessity therefor is compelling. It has been found that atrocity propaganda
begets atrocities. An audience subjected to atrocity propaganda will react
in the normal human way and will effect reprisals in kind if the opportunity
offers, so that the outcome is an auction of cruelty, each side seeking to
excel the other in wantonness without achieving any respectable military
goal. Such propaganda makes combat operations more unpleasant without
increasing their effectiveness, and it interferes with national policy in the
post-war period, by leaving residual hatreds which are difficult to overcome
for normal international relationships. When an enemy has in fact committed
atrocities, news thereof is good propaganda only when it is desired to punish
the enemy, when punishment can in fact be applied without reprisal in kind,
or when publicity may have the effect of forestalling further atrocities of the
same kind. (This signifies, usually, that atrocities committed against ci-
vilians or prisoners far behind the line of operations are often the appro-
priate subject of publicity, but that atrocities committed in the course of
operations are not sound propaganda material unless compelling national
policy requires their use.)
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